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Response
Andrew Latham
I. Introduction
Let me begin by thanking Dr. Gardiner for coming to Macalester and
providing us with a thoughtful and thought-provoking critique of the
United Nations, an institution near and dear to the hearts of many
members of the Macalester community. One of the hallmarks of a quality liberal arts education is programming that purposefully exposes
students to ideas with which they may not be familiar or even comfortable; that forces them out of their intellectual comfort zone, to think
again about what they believe and why they believe it; and that allows
students to experience the clash of large and consequential ideas. Given
what I know of the Macalester “common sense” regarding the United
Nations (not to mention our historical and contemporary attachments
to that organization), I think it is safe to say that Dr. Gardiner’s essay
does all of those good things. It certainly challenges many of our collectively held shibboleths about the U.N., and I have to say I have
never before heard Ambassador Bolton described in quite so glowing
terms on this campus. In short, I view this essay as a very welcome
contribution to a potentially difficult dialogue about the future of an
institution that I’m sure many of us think of as unambiguously good
and virtuous.
That being said, how should we assess the specifics of the argument
advanced by Dr. Gardiner? Put simply, I can sum up my evaluation in
this way: even when judged in terms of its own project (which, as we
shall see, is largely derivative of the broader neoconservative effort to
renew American hegemony), his proposals must ultimately be found
to be either irrelevant or counterproductive. More specifically, I will
argue that Gardiner’s argument is premised on a deeply flawed understanding of “power” that equates the possession of material resources
(weapons, money, etc.) with influence (the capacity to realize its goal,
even in the face of opposition from others). Second, I will argue that his
argument depends on a conceptualization of international hegemony
that is similarly misguided by positing that American preponderance
in the realm of material resources, coupled with the “obvious” moral
rectitude of its global policy preferences, naturally confers upon the
U.S. the mantle of leadership. Finally, I will demonstrate how all of
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these errors converge to suggest a program of U.N. “reform” that is
largely beside the point, at least if one is truly interested in renewing
American hegemony. I conclude by arguing that what is needed now
is not so much U.N. reform but “hegemonic reform”—that is, reform
of the way in which the U.S. practices leadership in the international
domain. To be sure, there are ways of tweaking the structures and
practices of the U.N. that would make it (marginally) more effective
and legitimate. Ultimately, however, the legitimacy and stability of the
current U.S.-centered world order is a function of American leadership. Enlightened multilateralism has the capacity to breathe new life
into the existing U.N., making the need for root-and-branch reform
unnecessary. Predatory unilateralism, on the other hand, will cripple
the U.N., no matter what formal, technical, or political reforms are
introduced.
II. Neoconservatives, Hegemonic Renewal, and the U.N.
At one level, Gardiner’s project is the renewal of the United Nations
Organization. His goal, he argues, is to suggest a set of reforms that
will restore the confidence of both the United States government and
the American people in an institution that is failing to deliver on the
promises of its founding charter. At a deeper level, however, Gardiner’s project is actually part of the broader neoconservative project to
renew American leadership in the global political economy. At the
risk of eliding important differences of emphasis among its various
adherents, neoconservative geopolitical discourse comprises the following defining elements. First, neoconservatives understand the
existing world order to be dominated by states. While they accept the
existence of non-state and institutional actors (international organizations, NGOs, etc.), they see these as relatively marginal epiphenomena
of the state-system (the only partial exception would be global terror
networks, such as Al-Qaida, and even these are viewed as dependent
upon state sponsors). Second, neoconservatives understand power
to be a function of wealth and military force. For them, influence in
international affairs is directly related to the possession of material
resources, such as weapons and money. Third, understood in this way,
the U.S. currently enjoys an overwhelming preponderance of power,
which necessarily confers upon it the mantle of global leadership.
Fourth, the current era is thus “unipolar” in nature. In other words,
it is one in which the U.S. lacks a serious “peer competitor” and thus
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enjoys the status of being the “sole superpower” in the global geopolitical system. Deriving directly from this concept is the view that
now is a moment of unprecedented opportunity to remake the world
in America’s image by exporting the blessings of the American way of
life, rewriting the rules of global order, and securing America’s current
military, economic, and cultural pre-eminence. Finally, the neoconservatives see the unipolar moment as one of new dangers (terrorism,
rogue states armed with WMDs, etc.) that must be met decisively with
all the tools (military, diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and
so on) available to the U.S. and its allies. Although perhaps tempered
by recent experiences in Iraq, neoconservatives see the use of coercive
threats backed by credible military force as a primary instrument of
American statecraft.
Gardiner’s particular contribution to the neoconservative literature
is that he provides a clear articulation of the ways in which adherents
to this geopolitical school of thought (a) understand the United Nations
and (b) believe it should be reformed. With respect to the former, the
text clearly conveys the palpable sense of disdain-bordering-on-disgust
that most neoconservatives harbor toward the United Nations. Beyond
that, it also articulates the view that the U.N. is ultimately nothing
more than a nuisance verging on becoming an irrelevance. For most neoconservatives, the U.N. is either an irrelevance in that it aspires to little
more than “realpolitik by committee” (and is therefore congenitally
defective) or a nuisance in that it is the site at which the world’s Lilliputians sometimes successfully forge politico-diplomatic bonds that they
then attempt to use to restrain the American Gulliver. Thus, as part
and parcel of the project of American hegemonic renewal, they tend
to advocate abolishing or withdrawing from the U.N., or taming it by
making it more reflective of, and responsive to, U.S. values and interests. Gardiner has clearly synthesized these two positions, arguing that
the U.N. is, in fact, a bothersome nuisance sliding quickly toward irrelevance. For him, the “solution” (always framed against the backdrop
of the underlying project—the revitalization of American leadership)
is to impose a package of reforms in the realms of accountability and
transparency, peacekeeping, and human rights. These might not save
it from irrelevance, but would surely make it less of a nuisance to a
United States seeking to impose its own values on, and pursue its own
interests in, the world.

72

Andrew Latham

III. Conceptual Errors:
An Immanent Critique of the Neoconservative Strategy
In assessing this project, it is useful to employ the Hegelian method of
“immanent critique”—that is, to subject it to criticism on its own terms
in order to highlight its internal inconsistencies and logical errors.
Accordingly, I take as my point of departure the same premise as the
neoconservatives: that the unipolar moment is propitious for reasserting and revitalizing American leadership in the world. I then proceed
to demonstrate how a number of ultimately debilitating conceptual
errors prevent neoconservative thinkers from understanding what this
would truly entail, leading them instead to adopt a strategic vision that
is directly responsible, inter alia, for the series of tragic blunders that is
the Bush Administration’s Iraq policy.
A. The Naïve Concept of Power
Simply put, neoconservatives like Gardiner share an erroneous understanding of “power” that is possessive, material, and subjective in
nature. It is possessive in that it rests on the premise that a state can
possess a quantifiable commodity of power simply by virtue of controlling certain resources. It is material because it equates the possession of tangible resources, such a guns and money, with the ability to
influence outcomes and realize objectives. Finally, it is subjective in that
it ignores the social (or intersubjective) nature of power, at least in the
sense of an ability to bring about desired outcomes in a multi-actor
setting. In short, although neoconservatives sometimes talk about the
“soft power” putatively generated by American culture and its “universal” values, they understand real power almost exclusively in coercive terms. In other words, they see power as the threat or use of force
(whether military, diplomatic, or economic) to compel others to behave
in a particular way.
While capturing something salient (coercion, after all, can have an
important role to play in politics), this is a profoundly naïve understanding of power in that it ignores the social, intersubjective dimension of all human phenomena, and, perhaps more importantly, because
it attempts to wish away the inconvenient need to negotiate with and
accommodate others if one is to govern effectively. Somewhat more
specifically, there are three fatal flaws with this conceptualization of
power. First, it confuses the possession of material resources with influ-
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ence and the ability to induce others to act in accordance with one’s
wishes. While there is a relationship between resources and power,
there is no direct correlation. The first simply does not confer the second. Military power, for example, is not always convertible into influence across the full range of issues that comprise contemporary global
politics. Second, even as a means of inducing certain forms of behavior, coercion and force produce only temporary, unstable, and costly
forms of influence, a reality attested to by thinkers like Edmund Burke
and Niccolo Machiavelli, who have been appropriated by the political right, as well as leftist thinkers like Antonio Gramsci. It effectively
ignores the nonmaterial forms of power that flow directly from the
social context of all human political relationships. Pace Mao Zedong
and others of his ilk, power does not, in fact, flow from the barrel of a
gun. At best, then, this form of power can produce domination; it cannot
deliver hegemony, properly understood as involving consent as well as
coercion.
B. A Tragically Flawed Understanding of “Hegemony”
Dr. Gardiner and other neoconservatives understand leadership or
hegemony as a function of the preceding definition of power: preponderant power equals preponderant influence (which is by definition leadership). In this view, the unipolar moment is by necessity a
moment of U.S. leadership because it is when the U.S. can exercise
sufficient coercive power to establish the rules of the game that it feels
best suit its needs, values, and interests. Obviously, to the extent that
it is predicated on the naïve notion of power articulated above, this
view of leadership is similarly flawed. Indeed, the failure to grasp the
basic nature of political power seems to have led neoconservatives
like Gardiner to conflate two quite different concepts: domination and
hegemony. Since the neoconservatives came to power in 2000, this has
had tragic consequences for America’s position in the world.
As the writings of Antonio Gramsci, Robert Cox, and others make
very clear, however, hegemony is not simply domination. It is a form
of rule grounded in the legitimacy that accrues to a leader when (and
only when) that leader pursues legitimate ends (goals that are widely
accepted as providing benefits to both the hegemon and a substantial
portion of the subordinate actors); legitimate means (methods that are
consistent with generally agreed rules and widely subscribed institutional practices); and negotiated rule change (changes in procedural

74

Andrew Latham

and substantive norms that are at least endorsed by those subject to
these norms). In other words, hegemony is a form of governance based
perhaps implicitly on coercion, but in a more immediate and quotidian
sense based on the consent of the governed. Unlike domination, which
is always costly and unstable, history teaches us that hegemony tends
to be both stable and efficient, if always (and uncomfortably for some)
messy in the political sense of requiring negotiation, compromise, and
accommodation.
IV. Concluding Remarks
Ultimately, these errors converge within neoconservative thought to
produce a deep disdain for the United Nations. But just as the underlying conceptual premises are deeply flawed, so too are the inferences
that many neoconservative thinkers draw from them. While it may be
suffering from neglect, the United Nations is neither irrelevant nor a
nuisance. Rather, it is the principal entity that legitimizes the existing
U.S.-based global order. Simply put, it is an indispensable element of
American hegemony. Consequently, any attempt to revitalize American hegemony will require two steps.
To begin with, it will require reforms of the U.N. that will enhance
its legitimacy. If hegemony requires consent—and if consent requires
legitimate ends, legitimate means, and negotiated rule change—then
the U.N. is necessary to U.S. hegemony in several ways: it confers legitimacy on specific actions (such as approval of policies as being consistent with global norms); it modulates U.S. policy so that it becomes
more legitimate (that is, it “tweaks” hegemonic policies so that they
become more consistent with global norms); and it legitimizes rules
and norms that are consistent with America’s long-term interests. Significantly, while other international organizations are important elements of the U.S.-based global order, the United Nations is unique
in that it is the only universal organization that deals with issues of
international peace and security. Put simply, if the U.N. did not exist,
Washington would probably have to create something very much like
it. All this being the case, I suggest that America’s interests would ultimately be best served by two sets of changes to the U.N. that would
enhance its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. First,
in broad-brush terms, the Security Council needs to be reformed so
that its membership becomes more reflective of both the actual distribution of power and the major regions or civilizations comprising the
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global community. Second (and here I agree with Gardiner), sustained
efforts need to be made to address the problems of waste, incompetence, and corruption within the organization. Whatever the details,
however, the key ingredient is that these reforms will have to be negotiated in good faith (no more threats of exit if Washington does not get
its way). Carried out properly, in a manner consistent with the principles of power and hegemony outlined above, reforms such as these
have the potential of enhancing the legitimacy of both the U.N. and the
United States.
Beyond reforming the U.N., the revitalization of U.S. hegemony
(the avowed goal of Gardiner and the neoconservatives) will require
the reform of U.S. policy toward the multilateral order in general and
the U.N. is particular. Put directly, and contrary to the prescriptions of
Gardiner and the neoconservatives, the revival of American hegemony
must involve the adoption of an international posture that is far more
constructively multilateral than has been the case since the neoconservatives assumed power. The U.S., for example, needs to adopt a grand
strategy that emphasizes (a) the collective framing of rules and laws to
govern global political life as well as a willingness to subordinate U.S.
interests to those laws; (b) the creation of robust multilateral institutions (to regularize power and help with coordination and cooperation); (c) the provision of certain “public goods” (maintaining the basic
rules of the system, promoting cosmopolitan goods such as human
rights, etc.); and (d) the impartial application of “justice” (including
a reasonable degree of global distributive justice; justice for victims
of historical processes such as forced migration, colonial oppression,
etc.). Such policies would re-establish the legitimacy of American leadership far more effectively than the unilateral, and at times highly
militaristic, policies espoused by the neoconservatives. Absent such a
strategic shift, it is hard to imagine that any changes in the form, composition, or practices of the U.N. would have any significant impact
at all on either the contemporary world order or American leadership
within that order.
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